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Abstract Competition law enforcement, whether by public officials, private parties
and consumers or the courts, has to resolve informational and resource asymmetries.
Current EU competition law establishes an interface between government
enforcement action and private litigation. For the EU Commission, informational
asymmetries will be primarily addressed under positive comity agreements with
other countries and its leniency programme. For private parties, the success of a
stand-alone or follow-on action for damages critically depends on disclosure of
documents. The Court of Justice of the European Union attempts to strike a balance
between disclosure and the Commission’s preference for confidentiality. Nonethe-
less, the EU law concept of effectiveness and equivalence of competition law
enforcement does not supersede national law rules on procedure or liability of
private parties. The Court of Justice applies a negative harmonisation strategy
towards national laws. Where appropriate, the paper will assess enforcement
practice under U.S. law.
Keywords Competition law  Public and private enforcement  Law of procedure 
Discovery and comity
This article is based on a presentation given at the 3rd China-EU Legal Forum (CELF) which took place
at the Supreme Court of Cassation in Rome on 8./9.9.2015. The 3rd CELF was co-organised by the
China Law Society, the Bar Association of Rome, the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT), the China-EU School of Law at the China University of Political Science and Law
and the College of Comparative Law at the China University of Political Science and Law).
& Rainer Kulms
kulms@mpipriv.de
1 Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany
123
China-EU Law J (2017) 5:209–231
DOI 10.1007/s12689-016-0073-8
1 Competition enforcement policy: the scenario
1.1 The players
EU competition policy enforcement has become a multi-player game between Union
and Member State officials, private businesses, consumers1 and national courts.2
Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 replaced Commission-centred enforcement by a system of
parallel competences between Member State and EU authorities. A European
Competition Network has been set up to address informational and resource
asymmetries between national enforcement authorities and the Commission: Cases
are allocated and information on ongoing investigations is exchanged.3 The activities
within the European Competition Network demonstrate that the current focus on public
v. private enforcement of competition law needs to be supplemented by an analysis of
intergovernmental arrangements for cross-border coordination of investigation and
enforcement activities.4 International cooperation ismotivated by a concern for efficient
competition law enforcement.5 It is also driven by the quest for judge-proof evidence in
the face of information and resource asymmetries.6
Directive 2014/104/EU on private actions for damages for breaches of EU
antitrust law ensures the ‘‘effectiveness of the competition rules’’ by private
enforcement.7 Access to documents held by competition enforcement authorities
1 Cf. on the objectives of competition law from the angle of consumer protection: Buttigieg 2009 7 et
seq., 65 et seq.
2 See EU Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU
Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC (2004/C 101/04) 2004. For empirical data on
enforcement decisions by the EU Commission and Member States’ competition authorities: European
Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Ten
Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives
(COM(2014) 453) 2014b (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/antitrust_
enforcement_10_years_en.pdf), and the accompanying EU Commission Staff Working Document,
Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and
procedural issues (SWD(2014) 231/4) 2014a (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
legislation/swd_2014_231_en.pdf).
3 See Council and the Commission Joint Statement of the on the Functioning of the Network of
Competition Authorities 2002 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/joint_statement_en.pdf),
and § 3 of the : Merger Review of the EU Merger Working Group, adopted on 8 November 2011
(available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/nca_best_practices_merger_review_en.pdf). For a crit-
ical assessment see Munari 2014 at p. 111 et seq.
4 Cf. Munari 2014 117 et seq., noting that each national competition enforcement authority operates
within the framework of its domestic national laws). On the private international law implications of
cross-border antitrust enforcement: Basedow Francq Idot 2012 1 et seq.
5 See OECD Recommendation of the OECD of 16 September 2014 concerning International Co-
operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings [C(2014)108] 2014a (available at http://www.
oecd.org/daf/competition/2014-rec-internat-coop-competition.pdf).
6 See OECD, Challenges of International Co-operation on Competition Law Enforcement 2014b
(available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/challenges-international-coop-competition-2014.htm).
7 Recital (6) of the Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of




and private parties is vital for alleviating information asymmetries in private
litigation, in both common and civil law jurisdictions.8 Case law from the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) indicates that private parties wish to improve
their evidentiary position by gaining access to Commission documents.9 But parties
may be frustrated by an unclear relationship between public and private
enforcement, between EU competition law and national rules of substance on civil
liability10 and reluctance from the European Competition Network.11
1.2 Outline of the paper
This paper will first review the implications of informational and resource
asymmetries for public and private enforcement. It will then assess the challenges of
cross-border enforcement as public officials will have to account for the impact of
globalisation, different regulatory approaches and the need to exchange information
under traditional concepts of sovereignty and modern notions of comity.
Antitrust law enforcement is to ensure that substantive concepts of competition
and free markets will be upheld. But the day-to-day practice of public and private
enforcement reveals that the law of procedure plays an important role in handling
informational asymmetry. The function of pleading requirements in the light of
directive 2014/104/EU, discovery and burden of proof rules and cost aspects will be
assessed. The interplay between rebuttable presumptions, evidence and law of
substance will be extended to parent-subsidiary relationships where competition law
enforcement has to handle informational asymmetries under conglomerate struc-
tures and the single-unit entity doctrine. A section on collective redress mechanisms
to overcome resource asymmetries concludes.
2 Law enforcement under informational and resource asymmetry
2.1 The basics of public and private enforcement
Enforcement decisions by public authorities are the result of a policy choice in
the face of informational and resource asymmetries.12 In a study on antitrust
enforcement Besanko and Spulber assess the optimal policy design where
collusive behaviour cannot be observed and the information on production costs
is private13: Under these circumstances enforcement agencies will have to
8 See studies by Cortese 2014a, b, c, Munari 2014 and Pace 2014.
9 See infra sub 2.4.
10 Cf. Cortese 2014a, b, c 146 et seq. and Pace 2014 244 et seq. and infra sub II.4., 5. and III.1., 2.
11 See Resolution of the Meeting of the Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012,
Protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions (available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf).
12 Cf. on the use of antitrust law in order to address economic inequality due to information asymmetry:
Newman 2014 854 et seq.
13 Besanko, Spulber 1989 408 et seq.
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tolerate a certain degree of collusion although the law classifies price fixing as
illegal per se.14 Nonetheless, enforcement authorities should maintain a high
profile of prosecuting cases for the sake of credibility15 even if the social
benefits are relatively small in relation to the deterrence.16 An economic analysis
of the concepts of harm and damages in antitrust shows that public and private
enforcement have to be mindful of interface between deterrence to others and
compensation.17 The EU Commission’s focus on certain industries and ‘inno-
vative’ anticompetitive practices reflects a realistic assessment of its enforcement
capacities.18 The Commission will concentrate on business activities where
enforcement officials have discerned a high probability of success in their fight
against cartels.19 In a cross-border scenario the enforcement strategies depend on
the Commission’s ability to resolve informational asymmetries by engineering
positive comity agreements with other countries.20
The best price-fixing conspiracies operate on the paucity of public informa-
tion.21 Win rates in private enforcement litigation are related to the plaintiff’s
ability to come up with sufficient information about defendants’ anticompetitive
behaviour.22 Win rates are also determined by a meaningful relationship between
substantive law of antitrust and national laws rules on civil procedure.23 This is
not just a matter of carving out residues of national law-making in the face of EU
law.24 It is also a policy question (and one of economic analysis) whether private
enforcement supplements or undermines competition policies by public author-
ities.25 If the statutory pleading requirement is fulfilled as soon as a private
plaintiff establishes legal sufficiency of the complaint, private antitrust enforce-
ment would be more prevalent.26 If, on the other hand, successful pleading
depends on the strength of the evidence offered by the plaintiff, private stand-
alone litigation on anticompetitive behaviour will be scarce: Private plaintiffs will
not master the threshold of factual sufficiency without some limited discovery.27
14 Pe´nard, Squam 2002 214.
15 For an empirical analysis of the Commission’s enforcement practice Hu¨schelrath 2014 25 et seq.
16 Cf. Besanko, Spulber 1989 421et seq.; Pe´nard, Squam 2002 215.
17 Eger, Weise 2010153; Wagner 2007 618 et seq. and Eger 2007 674 et seq.
18 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future
Perspectives (COM(2014) 453) 2014b (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/
antitrust_enforcement_10_years_en.pdf), no. 4.
19 For a critical assessment of Commission’s current policy on fines Bosch 2014 56 et seq.
20 See infra sub 2.2.
21 Picker 2007 165.
22 Hylton 2002 154 et seq. See generally on competitor’s motives for initiating litigation against an
antitrust law infringer: Sokol 2012 703 et seq.
23 Cf. Wagner 2007 610.
24 Cf. Cisotta 2015 94, Kwan 2014 457.
25 Eger 2007 675.
26 Cf. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 SW 3d 422 (432) (Tenn., 2011).




But amicus interventions by public competition authorities might help private
plaintiffs to overcome their difficulties.28
2.2 Cross-border enforcement: comity agreements
Antitrust conspirators appear to relish the legal complexities of cross-border
infringements where ‘‘international antitrust claims are difficult, costly and time
consuming’’.29 U.S. judges reject the notion of a customary international law of
antitrust,30 relegating parties and their informational asymmetries to their respective
national jurisdictions. National enforcement agencies have chosen practical cooper-
ation, exchange of information and ‘positive comity’ agreements over theory and lack
of consensus on international antitrust principles.31Over the past 20 years theU.S. and
the EU have concluded a series of agreements on ‘positive comity’ with their major
trading partners,32 including the People’s Republic of China.33 Most agreements
enshrine a notification duty when enforcement activities might affect important
interests of the other party. In theUS-EU context, the 1998 comity agreement provides
for the deferral of envisaged enforcement activities by one party if the other party has
enforcement activities pending.34 The European Court of First Instance has held that
28 Cf. on amicus-curiae inventions by the Commission and national competition authorities: European
Commission 2014 b Staff Working Document, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation
1/2003, and Cortese 2014a, b, c 152 et seq.
29 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 2013 WL 6191965 (E.D.N.Y., 2013).
30 In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 127 FS 2d 702 (D. Md., 2001); Empagran S.A. v. Hoffman-
La Roche, Ltd., 2001 WL 761360 (D.D.C., 2001).
31 See the OECD’s assessment of the legal instruments for formal cross-border cooperation: OECD
2014a, and the OECD Recommendation on Co-operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings
2014c (available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/international-coop-competition-2014-
recommendation.htm).
32 See the list of Antitrust Cooperation Agreements published on the homepage of the U.S. Department
of Justice at http://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-cooperation-agreements (as of 31 July 2015), and the list
of Agreements on the EU Commission’s Homepage ‘Bilateral relations on competition issues’, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/.
33 Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust and Antimonopoly Cooperation between the United
States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission on the one hand and the People’s Republic
of China National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce, and State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, on the other hand, of 27 July 2011 (available at https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/110726mou-english.pdf). The Sino-US Memorandum does not go as far as the
positive comity agreements with other countries. It pledges to establish a dialogue on competition law
enforcement without prescribing intensive cooperation mechanisms of a ‘comity’ context. Nonetheless,
the Memorandum does not foreclose an exchange of information on specific enforcement issues or on
anti-competition proceedings by either side. A confidentiality clause has been inserted into the
Memorandum. From a Sino-European perspective see the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooper-
ation in the area of anti-monopoly law between on the one side The European Commission (Directorate-
General for Competition) and on the other side The National Development and Reform Commission and
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China of 20 September
2012 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/mou_china_en.pdf).
34 Art. IV of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the European
Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition
Laws of 3/4 June 1998 (available at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/cooperation-agreements/us-european-
commission-enhanced-positive-comity-agreement).
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the Agreement does not enshrine the principle ne bis in idem: According to the Court,
the legal interests protected by EU and US authorities are not identical. The sole
purpose of the Agreement is to ensure that one of the parties might benefit from the
practical effects of a procedure commenced by the enforcement authorities of the other
party.35 TheUS-EU 2011 ‘‘Best Practices onCooperation inMerger Investigations’’36
provide for cooperative investigation mechanisms whereby the Reviewing Agencies
should agree on a timetable for regular inter-agency consultations in order to guarantee
an equal level of information with respect to the economic data of an envisaged cross-
border merger.37
2.3 Transatlantic antitrust enforcement: concepts and cases
Since the late 1990s there has been an increasing awareness on both sides of the
Atlantic that cooperation and coordination have the potential of reducing asymmetry
and forum-shopping by antitrust infringers and consumer groups.38 However, cross-
border cooperation and coordinated enforcement strategies will not always bridge
policy differences on anti-competitive behaviour: The failed General Electric—
Honeywell merger taught the industry and enforcement officials that close
cooperation and an exchange of information are no guarantee for consistent
decisions by US and European antitrust agencies.39
2.3.1 Cooperation and coordination
In the WorldCom/MCI merger case an acquisition had taken place so that 80% of
the US domestic long-distance market was controlled by three providers. Moreover,
WorldCom was in a position with a small group of providers to dominate private
international line services to and from the US.40 As soon as the merger plan had
35 European Court of First Instance (Second Chamber), judgment of 15 June 2005, Tokai Carbon Co.,
Ltd. et al. v. Commission of the European Communities, joined cases T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and
T-91/03, recital no. 116, confirmed by European Court of Justice (Fourth Chamber) (with respect to case
no. T-71/03), judgment of 10 May 2007, case no. C-328/05P, sub nomine SGL Carbon AG v.
Commission of the European Communities, [2007] ECR I-3955 et seq.
36 US-EU Merger Working Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations of 14 October
2011 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/best_practices_2011_en.pdf and at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/111014eumerger.pdf), and FTC Press Release of 14 October 2011
(Washington, D.C.), United States and European Union Antitrust Agencies Issue Revised Best Practices
for Coordinating Merger Reviews – Agencies Celebrate 20th Anniversary of Cooperation Agreement
(available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/10/united-states-and-european-union-
antitrust-agencies-issue-revised).
37 See II.6 and III of the Best Practices.
38 See Bingham, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice 1994
Statement before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Concerning the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Washington, D.C. 4 August 1994 (available at www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/akbspch2.txt).
39 See address by James, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 2001 International
Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence, Address before the OECD Global Forum on
Competition, Paris, 17 October 2001 (available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9330.htm).
40 See In re Sprint Corporation Securities Litigation, 232 FS 2d 1193 (1200 et seq.) (D. Kansas, 2002).
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been notified with the US Department of Justice and the EU Commission, the
parties waived their confidentiality rights.41 Both US authorities and the EU
Commission reacted negatively when WorldCom announced plans to take over a
diversified telecommunications corporation (Sprint) with long distance, local and
wireless communication services.42 There was substantial cooperation between the
agencies, including exchanges of views on the analytical framework, coordinated
requests for information and attendance of US and Commission officials at hearings
in Brussels and Washington.43 Ultimately, the Commission prohibited the merger
between MCI WorldCom and Sprint.44 There was also close cooperation between
US enforcement agencies and the EU Commission when the US aluminium
producer Alcoa Inc. acquired Reynolds Metals Inc.45: The Commission approved
the merger, but requested assurances from Alcoa to divest itself of certain
activities.46
The 2007 fight against international price-fixing practices in the freight
forwarding services industry for air cargo is the result of coordinated raids by
antitrust enforcement officials in US, Europe, South Africa and Japan.47 Similarly,
coordinated activities took place in abolishing a price fixing cartel between air
carriers.48 One of the members of the cartels made an application to the US
Department of Justice and the European Commission to benefit from their
respective corporate leniency programmes.49 The applicant airline had approached
the US Department of Justice to avoid criminal liability, treble damages and joint
and several liability for the co-conspirators.50 Although the facts had clearly
established antitrust violations on both sides of the Atlantic, the plaintiffs of a
private class action against the airline defendant found it difficult to meet the
41 Ibid. at p.1200 et seq. See also European Commission, Case No. COMP/M.1741-MCI WorldCom/




44 Ibid. and European Commission, Press Release, Commission prohibits merger between MCI
WorldCom and Sprint (Brussels, 28 June 2000 (IP/00/668)) (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-00-668_en.htm).
45 James 2001.
46 Commission Decision of 3 May 2000 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common
market and the EEA Agreement, Case No. COMP/M. 1693 – Alcoa/Reynolds, O.J. L 58/25 of 28
February 2002.
47 Precision Associates, Inc. v. Panalpina World Transport (Holding), Ltd. 2011 WL 7053807 (E.D.N.Y.,
2011), see also European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission imposes € 169 million fine
on freight forwarders for operating four price fixing cartels (Brussels, 28 March 2012 (IP/12/314))
(available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-314_en.htm).
48 See the decision of the EU Commission: Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, Case COMP/
39258 – Airfreight (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39258/39258_
7008_7.pdf., Summary of the Decision in O.J. C 371/11 of 18 October 2014).
49 See In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 5958061 (E.D.N.Y., 2008).
50 Ibid.
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pleading requirements for bringing a case before a US court.51 Coordinated
investigations between enforcement of several countries may also establish that no
anti-competitive behaviour could be found and criminal charges will not be
brought.52
2.3.2 Discovery and comity
Private plaintiffs have attempted to take a free ride on the exchange of information
established under the positive comity agreements. European victims of anticom-
petitive behaviour seek to buttress their position before the EU Commission by
relying on discovery proceedings in the US, tacitly assuming that courts will
condone discovery without insisting on the procedures under the Hague Evidence
Convention.53 From the perspective of the EU Commission, a request for discovery
before a foreign court tends to undermine the efficiency of an antitrust investigation.
In their attitude towards comity US courts have shifted from leniency towards
discovery to being more receptive to foreign governments’ pleas for protecting the
secrecy of an ongoing investigation.54
2.3.2.1 Discovery of government documents in the US: Vitamins I Under rule 26
(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure55 parties enjoy broad discovery
privileges.56 In the Richmark case, the US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
upheld a judgment against a Chinese corporation which had been ordered to disclose
information on its worldwide assets.57 The Circuit Court applied a three-pronged
51 Ibid. See also In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 683 FS 2d 1214 (1220 et seq.) (D. Kansas, 2010):
Potential class members may not gain jurisdiction before a US court even if private enforcement of
antitrust claims in the Member States of the European Union is still in its infancy.
52 See the US Department of Justice, the Canadian Competition Bureau and the European Commission
investigating an alleged price-fixing conspiracy: In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM)
Antitrust Litigation, 681 FS 2d 141 (147 et seq.) (D. Conn., 2009).
53 The Convention on the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters, The Hague, 18 March
1970 (available at http://www.hcch.net/index_de.php?act=conventions.text&cid=82). See the analysis in
Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Ae´rospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District for Iowa, 482
U.S. 522 et seq. (1987) and In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 FS 2d 45 (47 et seq.) (D.D.C., 2000).
54 Cf. Miller, Nordlander, Owens 2010 4 et seq.
55 See 26 (b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (as of 1 December 2014, available at www.uscourts.
gov/file/rules-civil-procedure):
‘‘DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS.
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim
or defense—including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable
matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’’.
56 See Miller, Nordlander, Owens 2010 et seq. For an analysis of the problems of extraterritorial
discovery: Iontecheva 2001 888 et seq.
57 Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants et al., 959 F.2d 1468 (1471 et seq.) (9th Cir. 1992).
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test in order to ascertain whether the Chinese defendant had to disclose the
requested information although it had claimed its capacity as an instrumentality of
the Chinese government would exempt it from discovery. Under the Richmark
holding, the location of information and parties, the possibility of obtaining
information elsewhere and the balance of national interests are controlling.
The Vitamins cartel cases involved an international conspiracy to fix consumer
prices in the USA and abroad.58 When it came to discovery, U.S. courts
acknowledged that international comity might militate against enforcing a discovery
order for disclosing foreign documents. But ultimately the courts did not block
discovery of foreign documents.59 The European Commission, amongst others, had
filed amicus briefs arguing against the disclosure of documents which were the
object of ongoing antitrust investigations by the EU enforcement officials.60 The EU
Commission emphasised that disclosure of the corporate documents would
jeopardise its leniency programme and the cooperation with its US counterparts
in the interest of efficient global antitrust law enforcement.61 Moreover, the EU
Commission explained to the court that accepting discovery in principle would also
prejudice future investigations and coordination and cooperation of joint EU-US
enforcement strategies.62 The District Court disagreed.63
2.3.2.2 Vitamins II: discovery of EU documents in the US after Empagran When
the Vitamins case reached the U.S. Supreme Court,64 the Court advanced a comity-
inspired reading of the Sherman Act, the relevant US antitrust statute. In order to
accept US jurisdiction the Court insists on a domestic injury caused by foreign
anticompetitive conduct.65 Conversely, if there is domestic anticompetitive conduct
which does not create foreign injury, US courts will not help.66 Plaintiffs may not
seek discovery if the success of their claim is predicated upon foreign independent
harm. So far, the Supreme Court has not opined on how plaintiffs will fare if the
domestic effects of the incriminated anticompetitive behaviour are linked to the
foreign harm.67 Some courts have solved this query by requiring that in a price-
fixing conspiracy increased prices in the US must proximately cause foreign injuries
58 For an account see First 2008 712; cf. Destautels-Stein 2008 530 et seq.), and In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litigation, 120 FS 2d 45 (47 et seq.) (D.D.C., 2000).
59 See the account by Goldman, Hersh, Witterick 2005 6 et seq. (2005).
60 In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 2002 WL 35021999 (D.D.C., 2002).
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid. See the different factual setting of the Canada-related conspiracy: In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litigation, 216 F.R.D. 168 (D.D.C., 2003).
64 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A. et al., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (At that stage, the case involved
five distributors of vitamins from Ukraine, Australia, Ecuador and Panama, having allegedly participated
in a price-fixing conspiracy).
65 Ibid., at p. 165 et seq.
66 Ibid., at p. 175.
67 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 904 FS 2d 310 (319) (E.D.N.Y., 2012).
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to the plaintiff.68 This requirement is not met if the domestic effects of a global
conspiracy caused foreign injuries due to indivisible global market for the relevant
merchandise.69
It seems that, after Empagran, US judges have become more amenable for a
comity argument advanced in an amicus brief by the European Commission. In the
Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation70 the European affiliate of an US corporation
had approached the European Commission for immunity under the leniency
programme. The European affiliate produced documents to the Commission which
contained information on US and Canadian investigations. The Korean plaintiff, a
competitor of the US corporation, moved to compel discovery of the documents
submitted to the EU Commission. The court objected on comity grounds. Citing the
Richmark criteria,71 the court noted that the requested documents had not originated
in the US and that the defendant had produced some documents which it transmitted
to the US Department of Justice.72 In emphasising comity considerations, the court
accepted the EU Commission’s argument that the discovery of its documents would
jeopardise the US-EU cooperation in the enforcement of antitrust laws and rejected
the motion to compel discovery.73
In the Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation the direct purchasers sought
to compel discovery of a non-published EU decision directed at the US defendant
who had participated in an international price-fixing conspiracy.74 The court
decided in favour of comity and non-disclosure, since the European Commission
had a vital interest in maintaining the confidentiality of some parts of the decision.75
Comity also dictates a rejection if the motion to compel discovery would seriously
harm the EU’s investigation process of anticompetitive behaviour and circumvent
the European rules to access to file.76 Two recent cases highlight the problems the
EU Commission might face in the context of international cartels. In a Delaware
case on the consequences of an international price-fixing cartel, the EU Commission
had complied with the request of a local court for international assistance.77 The
Commission transmitted the redacted decision (i.e. without the confidential parts) to
the court.78 This redacted decision enabled the plaintiff to supplement some of the
68 Ibid., at p. 319.
69 In re Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, 2007 WL 137684 (E.D. Pa., 2007); see also In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 702 FS 2d 548 (559 et seq.) (E.D. Pa., 2010), and Empagran S.A.
v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd, 417 F. 3d 1267 (1270 et seq.) (D.C. Cir., 2005) (‘‘Empagran II’’).
70 In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 486 FS 2d 1078 (1082 et seq.) (N.D. Cal., 2007). See also
In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 4861544 (D. Del., 2008).
71 See 959 F.2d 1468 (1471 et seq.).
72 In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 486 FS 2d 1078 (1083).
73 Ibid., at p. 1084.
74 In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, 2014 WL 1247770 (N.D. Cal., 2014).
75 Ibid. See also In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, 2010
WL 3420517 (E.D.N.Y., 2010).
76 In re Application of Microsoft Corporation, 428 FS 2d 188 (194 seq.) (S.D.N.Y., 2006), citing from the
amicus brief of the Directorate-General for Competition of the EU Commission.




confidential information which was in his possession in order to make his complaint
more successful.79 Ultimately the court granted him permission to amend his
pleadings.80 The message of this case had not been lost on the Commission. In a
follow-up case, the Commission warned the defendants that it would oppose any
request for discovery of a redacted decision since this would violate EU
Commission rules and Member State policy.81 The U.S. court obliged.82
2.4 Access to public documents and discovery under directive 2014/104/EU
Efficient enforcement of rights depends crucially on access to information,
contained in both public and private files.83 Disclosure is the flip side of the ECJ’s
(as it then was) recognition of an individual’s right to claim damages with respect to
a breach of the EU’s competition rules.84 Chapter II of Directive 2014/104/EU
advocates a bifurcated approach towards disclosure of evidence and problems of
informational asymmetry. Under art. 5 (1) Member States are required to introduce
rules on discovery or rather, to empower national courts to order the plaintiff, the
defendant, or a third party to disclose relevant evidence under their control.85 In
issuing such orders, national courts shall be guided by proportionality concerns in
order to avoid fishing expeditions.86 Art. 6 of the Directive 2014/104/EU prescribes
rules on granting access to documents held by competition authorities. A special
regime is envisaged for leniency statements and settlement submissions. While a
party in litigation or a third party cannot request the disclosure of leniency statement
or a settlement submission, the court may be requested to scrutinise the documents
in camera in order to ascertain whether the documents deserve confidentiality
protection.87 According to art. 6 (2) of the Directive, the new disclosure regime shall
not affect rules and practices on public access to documents under Regulation (EC)
79 Ibid., at p. 755 et seq.
80 Ibid., at p. 758.
81 In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, 2014 WL 6602711 (N.D. Cal., 2014).
82 Ibid.
83 See the carefully balanced approach chosen by the CJEU in its judgment of 6 June 2013 (First
Chamber) case no. C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde v. Donau Chemie AG at el., para. 30 et seq.
84 See the ECJ, judgments of 20 September 2001, case no. C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan
and Bernard Crehan v. Courage Ltd., [2001] I-6297, of 13 July 2006 (Third Chamber), joined cases
C-295-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, [2006] ECR I-6619, of 6
November 2012 (Grand Chamber), case no. C-199/11, European Community v. Otis NV et al., para. 41 et
seq. and of 14 June 2011 (Grand Chamber), case no. C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, para.
28 et seq.
85 See on the Dutch rules on the disclosure of evidence: Cumming, Freudenthal 2010 202 et seq., and on
English disclosure rules in competition law cases: ibid., at p. 256 et seq.
86 See art. 5 (3) of the Directive 2014/104/EU.
87 See art. 6 (7) of the Directive.
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no. 1049/2001 which fleshes out art. 15 (3) TFEU88 on access to documents of the
European Union.89
In the Pfleiderer case from Germany, the applicant had made an application to the
Bundeskartellamt, the federal antitrust enforcement agency, to gain access to the
documents relating to leniency procedures.90 The CJEU rejects a flat refusal to
88 Art. 15 (3) of the Treaty on European Union and on the Functioning of the European Union (O.J. C
326/1 of 26 October 2012):
‘‘3. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in
a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance
with this paragraph.
General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of access to
documents shall be determined by the European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations,
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.
Each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are transparent and shall
elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in
accordance with the regulations referred to in the second subparagraph.
The Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the European Investment
Bank shall be subject to this paragraph only when exercising their administrative tasks.
The European Parliament and the Council shall ensure publication of the documents relating to the
legislative procedures under the terms laid down by the regulations referred to in the second
subparagraph.’’
89 Regulation (EC) no. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, O.J. L 145/43 of
31 May 2001. See artt. 1 and 2 of this Regulation:
‘‘Article 1
Purpose
The purpose of this Regulation is:
(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing the
right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the
institutions’’) documents provided for in Article 255 of the EC Treaty in such a way as to ensure the
widest possible access to documents,
(b) to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right, and
(c) to promote good administrative practice on access to documents.
Article 2
Beneficiaries and scope
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a
Member State, has a right of access to documents of the institutions, subject to the principles, conditions
and limits defined in this Regulation.
2. The institutions may, subject to the same principles, conditions and limits, grant access to
documents to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a Member
State.
3. This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution, that is to say, documents drawn
up or received by it and in its possession, in all areas of activity of the European Union.
4. Without prejudice to Articles 4 and 9, documents shall be made accessible to the public either
following a written application or directly in electronic form or through a register. In particular,
documents drawn up or received in the course of a legislative procedure shall be made directly accessible
in accordance with Article 12.
5. Sensitive documents as defined in Article 9(1) shall be subject to special treatment in accordance
with that Article.
6. This Regulation shall be without prejudice to rights of public access to documents held by the
institutions which might follow from instruments of international law or acts of the institutions
implementing them.’’
90 CJEU (Grand Chamber), judgment of 14 June 2011, case no. C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v.
Bundeskartellamt, [2011] ECR I-05161.
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access to leniency files.91 But the court adds a caveat: In granting access to the files
on a case-by-case approach national authorities are entitled to protect other relevant
interests in the face of the claims of a person adversely affected by anticompetitive
behaviour.92 On the other hand, a consumer organisation which considers an action
for damages before a national court may not be denied access to the Commission’s
files without a prior ad-hoc examination of the quality of the requested documents
and the potential need for confidentiality.93 Subsequently, the CJEU has attempted
to calibrate the Commission’s interest in protecting the confidentiality of its
investigations and leniency programmes against private interests to obtain
information to initiate litigation for damages.94 The Court authorises the Commis-
sion to operate with a presumption of confidentiality which private parties have to
rebut.95 This has led the Commission to classify documents into several categories
of confidentiality.96 In the Axa case, an insurance company had requested access to
more than 3000 documents held by the Commission. The CJEU accepted that the
Commission had provided the insurance company with a table of contents relating
to the documents filed with the Commission.97 Under the current state of
jurisprudence, neither the Commission nor national courts may adopt a rigid and
inflexible approach in balancing private parties’ rights to access to public documents
against the public interest in protecting confidentiality.98 This is also due to the
uneasy relationship between the law on the Commission’s enforcement activities
and Member States’ private law rules for follow-on proceedings.99
In several cases, the CJEU has opined on the requirements private parties have to
fulfil in order to rebut the presumption of confidentiality. The private plaintiff will
have to demonstrate that the requested information cannot be obtained elsewhere
but from access to the Commission’s files.100 It is as yet unclear whether this
91 Ibid., at para. 24 et seq. See EnBW Energie Baden-Wu¨rttemberg et al., case no. T-344/08, CJEU
judgment of the General Coiurt (Fourth Chamber) of 22 May 2012.
92 Ibid.
93 European Court of First Instance (First Chamber, Extended Composition), judgment of 13 April 2005,
case no. C-T 2/03, Verein fu¨r Konsumenteninformation v. Commission.
94 See the balancing test suggested by the European Court (Third Chamber) in its judgment of 7 July
2015, case no- T-677/13, AXA Versicherung AG v. Commission, para. 66 et seq.
95 CJEU (General Court—Third Chamber), judgment of 15 July 2015, case no. T-462/12, Pilkington
Group Ltd. v. Commission, para. 47 et seq. See also decision of the President of the CJEU of 11 March
2013, case no. T-462/12 R, Pilkington Group Ltd. v. Commission, at para. 44 (application for protective
order to maintain the confidentiality of information cleared for disclosure).
96 Ibid., at para. 6, and Opinion of Advocate-General Pedro Cruz Villalo´n of 14 April 2015, case no. C-
612/13 P, Client Earth v. Commission, at para. 55.
97 Axa Versicherung AG v.Commission, case no. T-677/13. See also CJEU judgment of the General
Court (Fourth Chamber) of 15 December 2011, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC
Hydrogene Peroxide), case no.T-437/08.
98 Ibid., para. 123.
99 See infra sub 3.
100 Axa Versicherung v. Commission,, at para. 76; judgment of the CJEU (Third Chamber), of 27
February 2014, case no. C-365 12 P, Commission v. EnBW Energie Baden-Wu¨rttemberg AG; and
judgment of 6 June 2013, case no. C-536/11 (First Chamber), Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde v. Donau
Chemie AG et al., paras. 32 and 44.
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requirement should be read as relegating a private plaintiff to a motion for discovery
before the competent civil court before access to public files can be sought. In
National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v. ABB Ltd. et al., the English High
Court acknowledged the Commission’s concern about disclosure of leniency
materials.101 Nonetheless, the Court questioned the Commission’s exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether documents submitted under the EU’s leniency
could be disclosed. The judge proceeded to a study of the materials and eventually
decided that some documents should be disclosed.102 English disclosure rules are
subject to proportionality considerations.103 With respect to disclosure in follow-on
litigation for damages, the Court of Appeal will not require a party to establish the
strength of its case prior to disclosure.104
2.5 Information on parent-subsidiary relationships
EU antitrust law does not sanction intra-enterprise conspiracies. The prohibition in
art. 101 (1) TFEU is triggered once anticompetitive ‘‘agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings (or) concerted practices’’105
can be found. Art. 101 (1) does not build on the concept of a company, a firm or a
legal person.106 Thus an agreement between undertakings of a conglomerate in a
parent-subsidiary relationship is beyond the scope of art. 101 (1) TFEU ‘‘if the
undertakings form an economic unit within which the subsidiary cannot (freely
determine) its… market (strategy) and… the agreements… are merely concerned
with the allocation of tasks as between the undertakings’’.107 However, both, the
CJEU and the Commission have refined this concept for the parent’s liability for its
subsidiary’s anticompetitive behaviour (single economic unit doctrine)108: Once a
parent-subsidiary relationship has been recognised, the parent company will be held
liable for anticompetitive behaviour of its subsidiary when it comes to imposing a
fine.109
101 [2012] E.C.C. 12 (Ch), sub no. 29 et seq.
102 Ibid., sub no. 56 et seq.
103 Kwan 2014 458.
104 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Europe Ltd. v. Shell Chemicals UK Ltd. [2011] C.P. Rep. 1, sub no. 34 et
seq. (CA Civ.), KME Yorkshire Ltd. et al. v. Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd. et al. [2012] EWCA Civ 1190, sub
no. 32 et seq., and see Cisotta 2015 94.
105 Art. 101 (1) TFEU.
106 CJEU, judgments of 18 July 2013, case no. C-501/11 P (Fifth Chamber), Schindler Holding Ltd. et al.
v. Commission, sub para. 102 (available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=139754&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=554690), and of
10 April 2014, case C-233/11 P (Fourth Chamber), Commission v. Siemens AG O¨sterreich et al.
(available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=150784&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=432926).
107 ECJ, judgment of 10 October 1978, case no. 3/78, Centrafarm BV v. American Home Products
[1974] ECR 1147.
108 See the comprehensive analysis of the case law by Faull, Kjølbye in: Faull, Nikpay 2014 at § 3.49 et
seq.
109 CJEU (Second Chamber), judgment of 20 September 2011, case no. C-521/09 P, Elf Aquitaine S.A.
v. Commission, [2011] ECR I-8947 et seq. (at para. 88).
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The jurisprudence of the CJEU makes it abundantly clear that the ‘single
economic unit doctrine’ operates as an investigative device for the Commission to
overcome informational asymmetries arising from intricate conglomerate struc-
tures.110 There is a rebuttable presumption that a 100% subsidiary is under the direct
control of the parent company.111 The CJEU will only accept counter-evidence to
upset this presumption if evidence can be adduced that, in spite of the ownership
structure, the subsidiary was entirely free in developing its business strategy and
taking management decision.112 The single-economic entity doctrine is not confined
to 100% subsidiaries. Participations beyond 50% may also establish a presumption
in favour of the single-economic entity doctrine as long as there is evidence that the
parent company controls the decision-making process so that the subsidiary is
deprived of any discretion to determine its business strategies.113 A single-economic
entity is also deemed to exist where a corporation participates in an operating
company with several others and none of them has a majority, but one participating
company can veto the decisions of another.114
The ‘single economic unit doctrine’ has far-reaching implications when it comes
to calculating the fines for a breach of EU antitrust law. EU law departs from the
concept of personal liability to the extent that a parent company will have to suffer
the imposition of a fine for the anticompetitive behaviour of its subsidiary, if the
latter is part and parcel of the parent’s economic unit.115 The technical device for
imputing such responsibility is the concept of joint and several liability which is
intended to reflect the economic realities in a conglomerate.116 Thus, if the
Commission finds that participation of the subsidiary justifies a reduction of the fine,
the parent company shall also benefit from such a reduction if the parent company
did not engineer the anticompetitive behaviour and is only held liable under tie
imputation rules.117
Under U.S. law, control issues are also vital in the context of motions to compel
discovery. Private plaintiffs often seek to force the parent company to make a
110 Ibid., and judgments of 10 September 2009 (ECJ—Third Chamber), case no. C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel
NV et al. v. Commission, at para. 61 et seq., and of 16 November 2000 (ECJ-Fifth Chamber), case no.
C-286/98 P, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v. Commission, [2000] ECR I-9945 et seq., at para. 29.
111 CJEU (Fifth Chamber), judgment of 18 July 2013, case no. C-501/11 P, Schindler Holding et al. v.
Commission, at para. 109 et seq.
112 Ibid.
113 Faull, Kjølbye, Leopold and Nikpay, in: Faull, Nikpay 2014 § 3.65.
114 Ibid., at § 3.66.
115 See CJEU (Grand Chamber) judgment of 26 November 2013, case no. C-50/12 P, Kendrion NV v.
Commission, paras. 44 et seq., 55 et seq., and the analysis of the CJEU’s case law in the opinion of 30
May 2013 by Advocate-General E. Sharpston, para. 40 et seq.
116 See analysis in CJEU (Fourth Chamber), judgment of 10 April 2014, case C-233/11 P, Commission v.
Siemens et al., supra, and judgment of the CJEU (General Court—Fourth Chamber) of 15 July 2015, case
no. T-189/10, GEA Group AG v. Commission, para. 81 et seq.
117 CJEU (General Court—Fourth Chamber), judgment of 16 September 2013, case no. T-411/10,
Laufen Austria AG v. Commission, para. 228 et seq., see also judgment of 19 June 2014 (First Chamber),
case no. C-243/12 P, FLS Plast A/S v. Commission, at para. 85 et seq., and judgment of the Court (Fifth
Chamber) of 17 September 2015, case no. C-597-13 P, Total SA v. Commission, recitals 38 et seq., and
case note by Ahrens 2015 872 et seq.
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subsidiary disclose the documents which the subsidiary has in its possession. This is
especially apposite where the subsidiary and the parent company are of different
nationalities and reside in different countries.118 Control for the purpose of
compelling discovery is ‘‘the legal right to obtain documents upon demand’’.119 A
parent company which owns 43.8% of the shares of its subsidiary and nominates
only a minority on the board of directors has not control over its subsidiary.120
Conversely, the percentage of shares owned is not conclusive if the contractual
relationship is such that the minority shareholder has the legal possibility of
determining the decision-making process of the other corporation. If the relevant
contracts establish a principal-agent relationship, the principal can be forced to
disclose documents on the agent irrespective of the size of the participation.121
U.S. law holds some important comparative messages for the EU’s interface
between substantive antitrust law and the national law of procedure and substance.
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the parent company and its wholly owned
subsidiary were not capable of engaging in an anticompetitive agreement.122
Initially, the U.S. Department of Justice accepted the logic of this holding, both
from a jurisdictional and a liability perspective.123 Later, U.S. courts came to
challenge the liability implications of the single economic unit theory.124 They now
allow evidence that the parent company did in fact not have complete control over
its subsidiary125; hence the possibility that even in a conglomerate structure an
anticompetitive conspiracy with liability sanctions is possible.126
The Delaware Chancery Court has added an interesting127 alternative to the EU’s
single economic unit doctrine for discovery and liability purposes128: The EU
Commission had issued a decision against the members of a price-fixing cartel
under the single-economic unit doctrine, but it remained unclear whether there had
been additional fraudulent behaviour by one of the participants in the cartel. The
118 See analysis of case law in Strom v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 423 Mass. 330 (336 et seq.)
(Mass., 1996).
119 US v. International Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870 F. 2d 1450 (1452) (9th Cir., 1989); In
re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F. 3d 1090 (1107) (9th Cir., 1999).
120 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 FS 1138 (1152) (N.D. Ill., 1979).
121 St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. v. Janssen-Counotte, 2015 WL 2359568 (D. Or., 2015).
122 Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation, 467 U.S. 752 (771 et seq.) (1984).
123 Cf. U.S. Department of Justice, Economic Analysis Group, Discussion Paper on Organization,
Control and the Single Economic Entity Defense in Antitrust by D.V. Williamson (EAG 06-4—January
2006) (available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/organization-control-and-single-entity-defense-antitrust).
124 See analysis in Cox v. Cache County, 2013 WL 4854450 (D. Utah, 2013).
125 See also the US Supreme court analysing whether a corporation had ‘‘unitary decision-making quality
or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic of independent action’’: American Needle, Inc
v. National Football League et al, 560 U.S. 183 (196 et seq.) (2010).
126 See the detailed analysis in: Crosby v. Hospital of Valdosta and Lowndes County, 93 F. 3d 1515
(1526 et seq.) (11th Cir., 1996). As a corollary, courts have allowed suits by indirect purchasers to sue for
damages, since the parent company would not allow its subsidiary to file suit: In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel)
Antitrust Litigation, 2011 WL 5357906 (N.D. Cal., 2011).
127 See the discussion in Cox v. Cache County, 2013 WL 4854450 (D. Utah, 2013).
128 Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V., 85 A. 3d 725 (781 et seq.) (Del. Ch., 2014).
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Delaware court explained that it would accept the preclusive effects of the EU’s
decision in as far as a violation of EU competition law had been determined.129
However, the court expressly denies the preclusive effect of the findings of the
decision in as far as the plaintiff sought to attack ‘additional’ criminal behaviour.130
It is unclear whether the judge actually disapproves of the EU law’s technique of
imputing liability to a co-conspirator. But the Delaware case sends an interesting
message for follow-on proceedings under Directive 2014/104/EU. Findings under
the single-economic unit doctrine may not categorically preclude additional
evidence in a follow-on litigation for damages.
In 2014, the CJEU emphasised that the single economic unit approach does not
offer much guidance in resolving internal liability issues between the members of
the unit which have been held jointly and severally liable by the Commission. After
calculating the fine jointly and severally owed by the members of the single
economic unit the Commission has no power to allocate percentage-wise ‘shares of
liability’ to the various individual members of the single economic unit. This
formidable task is left to the national judges construing their respective private law
liability regimes.131 Under the current state of law it is unclear what the
‘‘effectiveness and equivalence’’ criterion132 of the Directive 2014/104/EU requires
the Member States to do under the fall-out from the single economic entity doctrine.
From a practical perspective, national courts will have to decide to what extent
substantive national private law and rules of civil procedure require a limitation of
single-economic-unit thinking.133 In his analysis of the CJEU’s jurisprudence
Bernardo Cortese has shown that it is not a foregone conclusion that Member States’
courts will automatically extend the Commission’s single economic-unit doctrine to
follow-on proceedings for litigation.134 For him, the effectiveness of competition
law enforcement would not be jeopardised if the single economic-unit doctrine does
not extend to an antitrust version of corporate veil-piercing.135 For the English
Court of Appeal, the Commission’s single-economic-unit doctrine does not compel
English domestic corporate law to assume that the act of one company in a
129 Ibid., at p. 782.
130 Ibid., at p. 783.
131 CJEU judgment of 10 April 2014, joined cases C-231—233/11, Siemens. See also judgment of 5 June
2014, case no. C-557/12 (Fifth Chamber), Kone AG et al. v. O¨BB-Infrastruktur GmbH, para. 32 et seq.:
This applies also to causation criteria which have to be fleshed out in accordance with national legal
principles, but may not jeopardise the effectiveness of European competition law.
132 Cf. the sceptical analysis by Pace 2014 247 et seq.
133 The CJEU has authorised the Commission, however, to differentiate between the members of a single
economic unit. A subsidiary cooperating with the Commission under the Leniency Programme may claim
a reduction of the regular fine whereas the non-cooperating parent company may not: CJEU judgment of
19 June 2014, case no. C-243/12 P, FLS Plast A/S v. Commission, para. 87.
134 Cortese 2014b 83 et seq., 89 et seq.
135 Ibid., at p. 91 et seq.
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conglomerate is ‘‘automatically the act of any other group of that group’’.136
Disclosure has to precede the analysis of the strength of the case.137
3 The law of procedure
3.1 Pleading requirements
Access to information and disclosure of documents are ‘‘information revelation
mechanisms’’138 vital for the success of a stand-alone or follow-up litigation. It is
often overlooked that these mechanisms will only be triggered if plaintiffs master
the initial threshold of stating their case in accordance with national pleading
requirements, respecting burden of proof rules. Art. 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003
places the burden of proving an infringement of the competition rules on ‘‘the party
or authority alleging (an) infringement’’. EU law is silent on standards of proof for
proceedings before the Member States’ courts; it does not offer much guidance on
the level of certainty national judges will have to observe in establishing the facts of
the case.139 Although national judges are under a general duty not to infringe the
‘‘general principles of (EU) law’’,140 it would seem that the recent jurisprudence of
the CJEU and Directive 2014/104/EU do not preclude national courts from
interpreting their respective rules of civil procedure more liberally with respect to
stand-alone or follow-on actions for damages.141 In this context, the development of
the law is still hampered by a paucity of cases in some jurisdictions.142 Within the
EU, a policy decision will have to be taken whether pleading standards should be
lowered to enable private plaintiffs to move beyond the admissibility stage so that
national courts can examine cases on damages more frequently. English courts will
defer a finding on the quality of pleading until disclosure has taken place.143
3.2 Burden of proof and cost rules
In accordance with art. 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 private plaintiffs have to bear
the burden of proof for establishing that they have sustained damages due to an
infringement of the competition rules. Again, this requires a policy decision to what
extent EU law concepts should interfere with national concepts in order to assure the
136 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Europe Ltd. v. Shell Chemicals UK Ltd. [2011] C.P. Rep. 1, sub no. 34 et
seq. (CA Civ.), sub no. 34 et seq.
137 Ibid., sub no. 43 et seq.
138 Rodger 2014a 43.
139 See recital 9 to Regulation (EC) 1/2003.
140 See on the harmonisation of national rules of procedure under the impact of the ECJ’s case law:
Cumming, Freudenthal 2010 at p. 6 et seq. Pace 2014 241 on the CJEU’s ‘‘negative harmonisation
framework’’.
141 See Cortese 2014a at p. 156 et seq., offering a comparative survey over Member State practice.
142 Cf. Cumming, Freudenthal 2010 at p. 328 et seq.; Brisimi, Ioannidou 2013 656 et seq.
143 See supra sub FN 136.
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efficient protection of private parties’ rights.144 In support of private litigation for
damages, burden of proof rules might be supplemented by rebuttable presumptions
which would shift the onus to the defendant. In a Dutch case, the then European
Court of Justice (ECJ) required Member States’ courts to grant an application for the
annulment of an arbitral award in breach of the competition rules: National law had
allowed the annulment for reasons of public policy.145
Although EU law concepts will be creeping into the interpretation of national
rules of civil procedure, the European Court will not go as far as redefining national
rules on res judicata.146 The CJEU will not stigmatise national courts either which
allow additional evidence in follow-on proceedings, although the Commission’s
decision may not be completely overridden.147 If stand-alone and follow-on
litigation is to add to enforcement of competition law, national judges need to retain
some independence and discretion148 at the interface between European rules of
substance, national laws of procedure and informational and resource asymmetry.
Member States’ laws on procedure follow the English cost rule whereby the
losing party pays the costs of the lawsuit, including the costs of the opposite
party.149 Before ascertaining whether this rule operates as a deterrent to private
plaintiffs it is useful to reflect on the various types of litigation in the damages
scenario. Follow-on litigation may be brought by competitors in the industry,
retailers suffering from the negative effects of a pricing conspiracy, and from
individual consumers claiming to have suffered losses from overpriced merchan-
dise.150 Although stand-alone litigation is (theoretically) open to plaintiffs pursuing
a claim for damages prior to the Commission’s determination of anti-competitive
behaviour, the cases most likely to be litigated are those where a contractual
relationship is challenged for breach of EU competition rules. From a legislative
policy perspective the question has to be addressed whether consumer protection
calls for the establishment of collective redress mechanisms in the field of EU
competition law.
144 For a comparative survey over Member States‘rules of evidence see D. Waelbroeck/D. Slater/G.
Even-Shoshan, (ashurst, Brussels 31 August 2004), at p. 52 et seq. (available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf). For an analysis of German
pleading and burden of proof rules in private competition law enforcement cases: Westhoff 2010.
145 ECJ, judgment of 1 June 1999, case no. C-126/97, Eco Swiss v. Benetton International, [1999] ECR
I-3079 (3093 et seq.) (at no. 37 et seq.).
146 Ibid., at p. I-3095 (at no. 46 et seq.).
147 In Bundeskartellbeho¨rde, Bundeskartellanstalt v. Schenker & Co. AG et al., Case C-681/11, judgment
of the Grand Chamber of 18 June 2013, the CJEU held that a national enforcement agency may refrain
from imposing a fine despite a finding of illegality (sub recital 48 et seq.). This does not seem to preclude
private parties from suing for damages: Cisotta 2015 97.
148 Cf. Cisotta 2015 96.
149 Cf. on the costs of competition law litigation under the current English rules on competition law
enforcement: Cumming, Freudenthal 2010 290 et seq., 295 et seq.
150 Brisimi, Ioannidou 2013 655 et seq.
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3.3 Collective redress
The European Commission has emphasised the value of collective redress
mechanisms for private law enforcement in consumer protection and competition
law cases.151 This is not to suggest that collective redress will automatically
recalibrate informational asymmetries in competition law enforcement. But it is the
Commission’s tacit assumption that collective redress will alleviate the plight of
resource of asymmetries and, hence, reduce the cost of addressing informational
asymmetries in complex competition law cases by conferring standing on qualified
entities or ad-hoc representative groups.152 Qualified entities such as consumer
associations, state bodies or associations or ad-hoc groups are thought to police
claims which individual claimants might be deterred from pursuing due to the
unfavourable cost-value ratio.153 Although collective and representative redress
mechanisms add clout to competition law,154 they cannot escape the policy debate
about the scope of private litigation in the face of enforcement activities by the
Commission and Member States’ antitrust authorities.155 In the field of collective
redress, this debate will be cloaked as an argument about standing, certification of
ad-hoc groups, whose claims organisations pursue, and about opt-in or opt-out
devices.156 The most recent U.S. experience seems to tilt the scales in favour of
restrictions on private enforcement: The Supreme Court’s stance on stricter pleading
requirements for private damages can be interpreted as an attempt to close the
floodgates for class actions for damages in antitrust cases.157
4 Conclusion
In the EU, competition law enforcement is a multi-player game, staged by public
officials, private businesses, consumers, the CJEU and national courts. Informa-
tional asymmetries are multi-dimensional and predicated on an interaction between
government enforcement officials and private litigators. Nonetheless, public and
private enforcement interests often seem to be at war with each other. Access to
public documents by private parties by a European-style discovery is vital for stand-
151 See recital 7 of the Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations
of rights granted under Union Law (2013/396/EU), O.J. L 201/60 of 26 July 2013.
152 For a survey over consumer-related collective redress mechanisms in the case law of the Member
States: Rodger 2014b at p. 161 et seq.
153 See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the
EC antitrust rules (COM(2008) 165 final, Brussels 2 April 2008) and id., Green Paper on Damages for
breach of the EC antitrust rules (COM(2005) 672 final, Brussels, 19 December 2005), and analysis by van
Uytsel 2012 57 et seq.
154 See van Uytsel 2012 at p. 73 et seq.
155 See passim on class actions in Italian antitrust cases and European repercussions: Cortese 2014c 107
et seq.
156 van Uytsel 2012 at p. 81 et seq., on the tension between individual interests and the public interest.
157 See Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (553 et seq.) (2007).
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alone and follow-on litigations, but may severely jeopardise confidential informa-
tion collected under a leniency programme. The current focus on the effectiveness
and equivalence of competition law enforcement tends to obscure that strategies
against informational asymmetries need to observe public international law rules,
EU norms on confidentiality and access and Member States’ laws on procedure and
liability. Regrettably, there is very little interaction between these fields of law.
U.S. cases on discovery of EU documents indicate that both, the comity and
confidentiality arguments are not immune from the scrutiny of substantive antitrust
and corporation laws. In the context of parent-subsidiary relationships and the
single-economic entity doctrine courts will allow discovery in order to establish
whether there was an intra-enterprise conspiracy to the detriment of third parties.
For the CJEU, the single-economic unit theory is no longer unassailable. Private
parties may offer evidence to escape liability consequences of the single-economic
entity monolith. As a corollary, the Commission’s determination of anticompetitive
behaviour does not categorically exclude additional evidence in a follow-on
proceeding. These details highlight one of the major shortcomings of current
attempts to develop a satisfactory regime on reducing informational asymmetries.
National laws on procedure and substance, especially on liability, are not
superseded by the EU laws on competition law enforcement, and it is far from
clear how much ‘positive’ harmonisation is necessary in the face of the CJEU’s
concept of ‘negative harmonisation’.158
Collective redress mechanisms are a useful tool for addressing financing
problems for private parties affected by anti-competitive behaviour. But they are
predicated on a policy choice how much competition law enforcement should move
from the Commission and national antitrust authorities to private parties. If the
Commission insists on the priority of public enforcement, national pleading
standards for private litigation will not experience a period of leniency.
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